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This paper estimates private life insurance and Kampo demand functions using household-level 
data provided by the Postal Services Research Institute. The results show that income, children, 
pension and knowledge factors have a significant effect on the decision as to whether each 
household purchases life insurance products. The amount of income and financial assets also appear 
to have significant effect on the purchase of private life insurance and Kampo. However, pension 
and bankruptcy experience appear only to have an impact on Kampo, while aged (less than 40) and 
occupation (civil servant) factors affect only private life insurance. Dummy variables representing 
comparison, knowledge, and bankruptcy experience did not have any significant effect on decisions 
concerning private life insurance. Simultaneous estimations are also used to examine why 
households that already have one type of life insurance product (e.g. private life insurance) purchase 
the other type of life insurance product (e.g. Kampo). The results indicate that income, children, and 
bankruptcy experience variables are not significant factors when households with private life 
insurance product decide to purchase additional Kampo. The results also show that a knowledge 




According to the Japan Institute of Life Insurance’s Annual Report, total insurance money held by 
all Japanese insurance companies, including individual insurance and annuities, reached 
approximately 1,200 trillion yen (about 11,702 billion US dollars) in FY 2003. This amounts to 
nearly 24,520 thousand yen per household (about 234,798 US dollars)
1. Since this represents a 
significant share of household total expenditure, life insurance is an important item when we address 
problems with Japanese household expenditure.   
A number of researchers have investigated the relationships between life insurance demand and 
factors such as household income, age, working style, the number of children, and so forth in order 
to shed light on the demand structure of life insurance products in Japan. For example, Tachibanaki 
and Shimono (1994) found that the total amount of financial assets, whether a spouse was working, 
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1  The number of households is from Japan’s 2004 Basic Register.   2
and the number of dependents (excepting the spouse) have a positive impact on insurance 
expenditure. On the other hand, income level and academic background have a negative impact on 
insurance expenditure. Alternatively, Urata et al. (1999) argued that household income, home 
ownership, persons aged less than 40, and children have a positive impact on both decisions, and that 
the amount of financial assets (腻) and spouse working full-time (腼) are significant factors affecting 
insurance expenditure. However, Masui (2000) has argued that risky asset and savings-oriented 
insurance are complements in that a household may hold both assets simultaneously. Further, the 
amount of savings-oriented insurance depends on the academic background (graduating from high 
school), household secondary income, and individual annuities. Finally, Komamura et al. (2000) 
proved that public pension and protection-oriented insurance are substitutes, while public pension 
and savings-oriented insurance are complements. 
The purpose of this research is to estimate the demand for life insurance in Japan. There are two 
points of departure of this study from previous work in this area. First, the study examines not only 
private life insurance products, but also Kampo. We can predict that households which have a greater 
knowledge of financial institutions, the law and markets usually purchase Kampo. There is no 
existing research that makes such a prediction. In addition, some households purchase not only 
Kampo, but also private life insurance products, even though both are strongly substitutable
2. In this 
case, what are the differences between households that have already purchased Kampo and do not 
purchase any insurance products and households, which purchase a private life insurance product? 
Second, we use knowledge and experience factors to estimate life insurance demand. Fierce 
competition has made financial institutions, the legal system and markets very complex. We predict 
that knowledge and experimentation with financial matters depends upon decisions about asset 
allocation. However, existing research has not examined such factors. It is therefore not possible to 
know whether the bankruptcy experience, for example, affects asset allocation
3. 
  There are several principal findings. First, income, child, pension and knowledge factors have a 
significant impact on the decision by individuals to purchase either life insurance product. The 
bankruptcy experience variable seemed to have impact only in the case of Kampo. Second, the level 
of income and financial assets appears to have significant effect on the purchase of both private life 
insurance and Kampo. Being aged less than 40 and civil servant occupation factors are shown to 
only affect the purchase of private life insurance. Third, income, child, and bankruptcy experience 
factors are not significant when households with private life insurance product purchase Kampo. 
                                                        
2  According to public comments by the Life Insurance Association of Japan in 2004, Kampo was 
founded to complement private life insurance products. At that time, Japanese private life insurance firms 
were very financially poor so that they could not sell proper life insurance products, especially to 
low-income individuals. Kampo and private life insurance products are now substitutable because private 
life insurance firms sell many other kinds of life insurance products. 
3  Previous research has not examined these problems because they only arose in conjunction with the 
dramatic changes in Japanese financial markets in recent years.   3
Knowledge also has a negative impact on additional purchases. Fourth, the existence of financial 
instability has little to do with the impact on insurance expenditure, but knowledge factors have 
some impact on the purchasing decision. However, households that have experienced bankruptcy 
previously tend to purchase Kampo instead of private life insurance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the background of 
the Japanese life insurance market. Section 3 introduces the data, estimation method, and 
explanatory variables. The results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we estimate and examine 
the simultaneous equation models. Some concluding remarks are presented in the final section. 
 
2. Background 
There are two main reasons today why each Japanese household has to choose an insurance firm 
and/or insurance product more carefully than in the past. First, insurance firms compete more 
fiercely to gain market share since the change in Japanese insurance law in 1996. With these changes, 
insurance firms could sell more consumer-oriented and differentiated products, so households need 
to consider the most suitable product from the wide variety available. Second, since 1996 some 
insurance firms have been bankrupted through this fierce competition. By May 2005, seven life 
insurance and two non-life insurance firms had been bankrupted. Accordingly, every household has 
to assess whether the insurance firm that they contract with will remain solvent in the future. 
In addition, all Japanese households have the option to purchase life insurance products outside of 
private life insurance firms. Japan Post sells public life insurance products named “Kampo”. Japan 
Post is not a private sector entity, but a form of public sector entity. In 2003 Kampo sold amounted 
to about 185 trillion yen (about 1,769 billion US dollars)
4, a little more than Sumitomo, Japan’s third 
biggest private life insurance firm
5. Thus, it is impossible to ignore Kampo when we examine the 
asset allocation of Japanese households.   
Japan Post tends to sell life insurance products that are very similar to those of other private life 
insurance firms. Since January 2004, Japan Post sells blended life insurance products with whole life 
and term insurance. This product is sometimes positioned as the main product by the private 
insurance firms. However, there are several differences between Kampo and private life insurance 
products. First, Kampo’s insurance money is restricted to under 10 million yen per person. Second, 
the Japanese government guarantees all insurance money if Japan Post were to go into bankruptcy, 
whereas private life insurance contracts sometimes fail when an insurance firm bankrupts. Third, 
Japan Post does not limit joining on the basis of professions. Fourth, Kampo is sold in post offices 
located across Japan
6. 
                                                        
4  See Postal Services in Japan 2004 (annual report), p.14. 
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3. Estimation for Life Insurance Demand Function 
3.1. The data 
This research shed light on some open questions described above using the data offered by the 
Postal Services Research Institute. At the same time, we also consider Kampo’s main role and what 
Kampo should be in the future. The data were collected by way of a questionnaire. The questionnaire 
contained very detailed individual information so that we could obtain appropriate data from the 
database. This database represents insurance money and insurance premiums of private life 
insurance, Kampo, and cooperative insurance. The number of valid responses was 4,182; a response 
rate of about 70%. Some 3,273 responses were from household with two members or more, and the 
remaining 909 from single-person household. In order to protect the privacy of respondents, we only 
get about 90% out of total, 3,762. Data from households that did not respond were excluded. In 
addition, we restricted the data in order to satisfy the following conditions: (1) the age of the 
householder is less than 60, (2) the householder is working. We restricted the data because we would 
like to focus on households whose requirements for life insurance were relatively high. Through 
these restrictions, the sample fell to 2,004 valid responses. 
 
3. 2. Equation for Estimation 
    In this section, we explain the estimation method used for the life insurance demand function. We 
can divide a household’s life insurance purchasing behavior into the following two stages. First, 
households decide whether to purchase life insurance products. Second, they decide the amount of 
insurance they decide to purchase. We must be careful that the observed amount of insurance shows 
only the demand of households who decide to purchase life insurance products. We express this by 
the following mathematical form:   
 
i i i u x y + = β
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In this situation, there exists the estimation bias ( ) / (
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offices.   5
Here,  λ (腅) is often called as “inverse Mills ratio” and is shown as 
         ) / ( / ) / ( ) / (
' ' ' σ σ φ σ λ β x β x β x i i i i i Φ =
7  
If we define  σ α / β ≡ , Heckman’s two-step method (Heckman (1976), Amemiya (1985), 
Wooldridge (2002)) is used to estimate the two-stage procedure, as follows: 
Step (1): Decision on whether to purchase life insurance products: 
Calculate  α ˆ , maximum likelihood estimator of  α , based on Probit model. 
Step (2): (If household decide to purchase life insurance products) 
Decision on purchasing amount of insurance purchased:   
Using positive observation, regress  i y onto  i x  and  ) ˆ (
'α λ i x . 
In this paper, we estimate the above two stages simultaneously using the maximum likelihood 
method. 
 
3. 3 Explanatory Variables 
Based on previous sections, we specify the following explanatory variables. 
Step (1): With respect to decision on whether to purchase life insurance products: 
                          Yen amount of income, yen amount of financial assets, occupation of non-household 
head dummy (1 if some of the member in family except for household head has a 
job, 0 otherwise), children dummy (1 if household has more than one child, 0 
otherwise), metropolitan dummy (1 if household is located in metropolitan area, 0 
otherwise), pension dummy (1 if household has more than one pensioner, 0 
otherwise), comparison of insurance companies dummy (1 if household compares 
more than three companies when they purchase life insurance product, 0 otherwise), 
knowledge on amendment of insurance business law dummy (1 if household knows 
amendment of insurance business law to allow insurance company to cut guaranteed 
yields, 0 otherwise), bankruptcy experience dummy (1 if household has experienced 
bankruptcy of financial institution which they often use, 0 otherwise).   
Step (2): With respect to the decision on purchasing an amount of insurance:   
             Amount  of  income,  amount  of  financial  assets,  age  of  household  head, 
owner-occupied house dummy (1 if household has their house with no loan, 0 
otherwise), public officials dummy (1 if occupation of household head is public 
officials, 0 otherwise), large-scale firm dummy (1 if household head works in 
large-scale firm with more than 500 employees, 0 otherwise), pension dummy, 
comparison of insurance companies dummy, knowledge on amendment of insurance 
business law dummy, bankruptcy experience dummy.   
 
                                                        
7  ) ( ), ( 腅 腅 i i Φ φ   mean density function and distribution function, respectively.     6
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 and the correlation matrix in Table 2. Note that the 
original questionnaire survey adopts class value alternatives instead of asking the amount itself. 
Therefore, we transform class value alternatives into an amount based on class average, and estimate 
the demand function. In addition, “amount of financial assets” includes “amount of funding 
saving-based insurance” in the questionnaire. Strictly speaking, we must exclude “amount of funding 
saving-based insurance” from “amount of financial assets.” Unfortunately, such information was not 
made available. Accordingly, caution must be taken when interpreting the results.   
 
------------------------------Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here ------------------------------ 
 
 
4. The Results 
In this section, we consider the life insurance demand function results shown in Table 3. The 
left-hand side is the results of the estimation for domestic private life insurance while the right-hand 
side shows the estimation results for Kampo
8. In addition, the lower part shows the result for the 
decision on whether purchasing life insurance products while the upper part shows the result for the 
decision on purchasing the amount of insurance. 
 
------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------ 
 
First, let us examine the estimation results for the life insurance holding function (lower part) and 
consider the statistically significant variables with respect to both domestic life insurance and 
Kampo. Both income and children dummy variables have a positive sign and are statistically 
significant. This is consistent with our expectations. Next, it is rational for a significant positive sign 
of pension dummy because a pensioner is an aged person and is considered to have a greater demand 
for life insurance. Knowledge of the insurance business law, which can be regarded as a proxy for 
financial literacy, has a significant positive sign. This seems to reflect the fact that the household 
who holds life insurance products tends to have more ample knowledge about financial conditions 
than a household with no demand.   
On the other hand, one distinctive variable that shows a different sign between domestic life 
insurance and Kampo is the bankruptcy experience dummy. This has a positive significant sign only 
                                                        
8  In the questionnaire survey, private life insurance companies are classified into two categories, 
domestic and foreign-financed, according to the following description. “With respect to private life 
insurance company, please take it as foreign-financed if all of the company name is expressed by 
katakana or Roman alphabet in principle. In other case, if company name is expressed by mixture of 
Chinese character, hiragana and katakana, please take it as domestic. Note that the following four 
companies are exceptions: Aoba (foreign-financed), Orix (domestic), Sony (domestic), T&D financial 
(domestic). ”   7
in the case of Kampo. This result reflects that Kampo provides safe products with a government 
guarantee
9. With respect to amount of financial assets, it shows significant positive sign only in the 
case of Kampo. However, as stated before, this variable also includes “amount of funding 
saving-based insurance,” so it is difficult to provide a clear interpretation.   
Next consider the estimation result for demand function on amount of insurance (upper part). Both 
the amount of income and amount of financial assets have a significant positive sign. This means 
that households with higher incomes and more financial assets need larger amounts of insurance
10. 
With the demand function for the private domestic private insurance company, the age of the 
household head has a significant negative sign. Generally, people tend to purchase more 
security-oriented insurance when they are young, so this result is understandable. Urata et al. (1999) 
also report a similar result, with a significant positive sign for the “less than 40 age” dummy. Further, 
the public officials dummy has a significant negative sign. This may reflect that public officials do 
not have to buy much security-oriented insurance because of better job security. Public officials also 
join in mutual-aid pension plan. This pension plan has some advantages in comparison with other 
pension plans joined by employees and the self-employed
11. In other words, public officials can get 
more pensions and so they tend to buy smaller amounts of insurance. On the other hand, the pension 
dummy shows significant positive sign only in the case of Kampo. This might reflect the fact that 
aged people tend to have a greater amount of endowment insurance.   
The three variables (comparison of insurance firms’ dummy variable, knowledge on amendment 
of insurance business law dummy, bankruptcy experience dummy) that are prepared as proxies of 
financial instability, they seem not to affect on the decision for purchasing amount of insurance. On 
the other hand, in deciding whether to purchase life insurance products, the knowledge dummy 
shows a significant positive sign in the cases of both domestic private life insurance companies and 
Kampo. In addition, bankruptcy experience dummy shows a significant negative sign only in the 
case of Kampo. In other words, households that have experienced bankruptcy within a decade tend 
to increase the probability of purchase insurance products supplied by Kampo, which provide safer 
products. From this result, we can say that recent financial instability and a sense of future 
                                                        
9  According to the questionnaire conducted by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2004 
(URL腆http://www.soumu.go.jp/s-news/2004/040817_1.html), the two top reasons for purchasing Kampo 
are “feel safety because Kampo is sold by Japanese government” and “Japanese government guarantees 
to pay the insurance money”. 
10  In the questionnaire, there is a question concerning the amount of debt. After transforming the class 
value alternative into a yen amount, we estimate the demand function but obtain a significant positive 
sign. This might be because the “amount of debt” includes housing loan, so household with higher 
income tend to have a similar amount of debt and this leads to a positive sign. Urata et al. (1999) also 
point out this possibility. However, this type of “debt” differs from the ordinary meaning of debt, so we 
report the estimation result excluding the amount of debt.   
11  For example, a mutual-aid pension plan has additional payments scheme. Moreover, the range of 
relatives that can obtain the survivor’s pension from a mutual-aid pension is wider than that of other 
pension plans.   8
uncertainty surely affect insurance purchasing behavior of Japanese households. Thus, the household 
needs to buy more insurance products if it is faced with bankruptcy because its insurance money 
may lower. However, according to the data, more than 50% of household heads who experienced 
bankruptcy are more than 50 years in age so that they may not be able to buy more insurance 
products. Even if they want to buy the insurance products, the insurance firms may refuse to contract 
or require paying very high insurance premiums. On the other hand, it is relatively easy for them to 
buy Kampo because Japan Post does not monitor each individual.
12  To sum up, the households that 
have experienced bankruptcy tend to purchase Kampo because the age of the household head is 
relatively high. 
 
5. Simultaneous Estimation   
5. 1 Portfolio of Life Insurance Products 
In the previous section, we estimated the demand functions of life insurance products offered by 
private domestic insurance companies and Kampo. However, household tends to hold multiple life 
insurance products simultaneously. In consideration of this fact, we attempt to devise an 
improvement for the more precise estimation using the same data.   
Table 4 shows household portfolio pattern of life insurance products based on the entire 
questionnaire sample. Each pattern is ranked in descending order. We see that “household which has 
only product offered by private domestic insurance company” is ranked as No. 1 and “household 
which has only product offered by Kampo” is ranked as No. 3. It proves that both products surely 
play an important role in Japanese households. On the other hand, there exists “household which has 
both products offered by private domestic insurance company and Kampo” and is ranked as No. 2. 
In addition, there are many other patterns for household to have multiple products offered by 
different institution. Therefore, in this section, we estimate and examine simultaneous equation with 
respect to decision on whether purchasing insurance products offered by private domestic insurance 
company and Kampo. 
 
------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here ------------------------------ 
 
 
5. 2 Method for Simultaneous Estimation 
Following the above formulation, there are two possible ways to estimate simultaneous equations.   
 
Case 1: In the case of allowing correlation between two life insurance holding function 
We use a simultaneous Probit model for estimating life insurance holding function. In short, we 
                                                        
12  Of course, it does not mean that Japan Post contracts without any conditions.   9
use the same setting as the previous section in estimating holding function, but here we allow for 
correlation of the error term between two equations with respect to private domestic insurance 
company and Kampo. We assume the distribution of error terms is expressed by the BVN (Bivariate 
Standard Normal Distribution). The formulation is as follows.   
 




1 ε + = β x y ,     0 1
*
1 1 > = y if y ,   otherwise  0  




2 ε + = β x y ,    0 1
*
2 2 > = y if y ,   otherwise  0  
†  Note  that  ) , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 ( ] , [ 2 1 ρ ε ε BVN 腠 ,  ρ : correlation coefficient. 
 
Case 2: In the case of holding two kinds of products simultaneously offered by private domestic 
Insurance company and Kampo 
The base settings are almost the same as case 1, but we employ an additional assumption that 
we can observe  ) , ( 1 1 x y  in the first equation only when household purchases life insurance 
product in the second equation (in other words,  1 2 = y ). In the context of our analysis, this 
means that we examine the factors for holding life insurance product offered by private domestic 
insurance company in the first equation, and examine the factors affecting why purchasing 
households also purchase a Kampo product in the second equation. This factor analysis corresponds 
to the largest simultaneous holding pattern in Table 4.   
 
 
5. 3 Estimation Results and Interpretation 
Our estimation result is shown in Table 5. 
  Case 1 shows the result of estimating the two holding functions in Table 3 simultaneously, while 
allowing for correlation between the error terms. The correlation coefficient ρ is 0.172. The sign and 
significance of coefficient shows almost the same tendency as lower part in Table 3, reflecting a low 
correlation. On the other hand, case 2 shows factors indicating that household with private life 
insurance product also purchase Kampo product. The ratio of households holding private life 
insurance product is about 62%, and the ratio of household holding Kampo product simultaneously 
is about 37%. We can say that income or the children dummy is not as important factor for additional 
holding of Kampo product although private life insurance holding function in the first stage shows 
almost the same tendency. In addition, the bankruptcy experience dummy shows positive sign, but is 
insignificant in the second equation.   
Further, knowledge dummy shows rather significant negative sign. This result can be interpreted 
as follows. The question in the questionnaire is that “the life insurance firms could change assumed 
interest rate before bankruptcy in accordance with amendment of insurance law since 24 August,   10
2003. Do you know that?”
13 This questionnaire conducted from 29 November to 21 December 
2003.
14  There were no insurance firms to apply such lowering. Thus, it is rather difficult to get that 
knowledge unless they are familiar with financial information in their daily life. In other words, 
knowledge dummy represents not only the knowledge about amendment of insurance law, but also 
more general knowledge about financial institutions and markets. 
We can obtain two reasons households that have the knowledge about amendment of insurance 
law do not purchase Kampo additionally. First, Kampo contains more saving factors than private life 
insurance products. Thus, these households want to invest not in Kampo, but in other financial assets 
that do not fix their money. Second, it is natural to think that these households purchased private life 
insurance products more properly because they have financial knowledge
15. Thus, they may not need 
to purchase more insurance product to adjust to their needs. 
 
------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here ------------------------------ 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper estimated private life insurance and Kampo demand functions using household-level 
data offered by Postal Services Research Institute. Our results show that that the income, child, 
pension, knowledge factors have a significant effect on the decision whether each household 
purchases life insurance products. The bankruptcy experience variable appears to have impact only 
in the case of Kampo.   
However, pension and bankruptcy experience appears only to have an impact on Kampo, while 
aged (less than 40) and occupational (civil servant) factors affect only private life insurance. Dummy 
variables representing comparison, knowledge, and bankruptcy experience did not have any 
significant effect on decisions concerning private life insurance. Simultaneous estimations are also 
used to examine why households that already have one type of life insurance product (e.g. private 
life insurance) purchase the other type of life insurance product (e.g. Kampo). The results indicate 
that income, child, and bankruptcy experience variables are not a significant factor when households 
with private life insurance product decide to purchase additional Kampo. The results also show that a 
knowledge dummy has a negative impact on additional purchases. 
  In relation to recent financial instability, this analysis shows the following results. First, the 
existence of financial instability has not impacted on insurance funds, but the knowledge factor has 
some impact on the purchasing decision. Second, households which experienced bankruptcy before 
have a tendency to Kampo rather than private life insurance. These results imply that financial 
                                                        
13  This question was originally written in Japanese. 
14  This amended insurance law passed in the Diet on 18 July 2003. 
15  Tanaka (1999) has investigated this point using an empirical approach.   11
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Table 艐腀腀 Descriptive Statistics
腀 Mean S.D. 䵩 慸
Dependent Variables
Amount of Insurance          (Domestic Private) 2531 3542 0 40200
Holding insurance dummy (Domestic Private) 0.6203 0.4854 0 1
Amount of Insurance          (Kampo) 296 891 0 19998
Holding insurance dummy (Kampo) 0.3164 0.4652 0 1
Holding insurance dummy (All) 0.7725 0.4194 0 1
Explanatory Variables
Amount of income 626.75 458.87 100 5000
Amount of financial asset 804.04 1309.65 100 10000
Age of household head 43.54 10.32 20 59
Owner occupied house dummy 0.2480 0.4320 0 1
Public officials dummy 0.0908 0.2874 0 1
Large-scale firm dummy 0.1786 0.3831 0 1
Pension dummy 0.1811 0.3852 0 1
Comparison of insurance companies dummy 0.0210 0.1433 0 1
Knowledge dummy 0.4716 0.4993 0 1
Bankrupt experience dummy 0.1652 0.3714 0 1
Occupation of non-household head dummy 0.9666 0.1798 0 1
Children dummy 0.6437 0.4790 0 1
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Table 艒 :腀腀 Estimation Results of Life Insurance Demand Function
 
腀             Private Domestic                    Kampo
Explanatory Var. Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
腀  Dependent: Amount of insurance Dependent: Amount of insurance
Amount of income 2.225 8.698
*** 0.348 2.793
***
Amount of financial asset 0.278 3.139
*** 0.111 2.546
**
Age of household head -34.709 -2.898
*** -2.018 -0.296
 
Owner occupied house dummy -102.531 -0.412
  -124.083 -0.988
 
Public officials dummy -622.381 -1.760
* 139.473 0.813
 
Large-scale firm dummy 44.168 0.174
  -186.869 -1.231
 
Pension dummy 209.624 0.806
  328.158 2.479
**
Comparison of insurance companies dummy 109.930 0.147 302.205 0.881
Knowledge dummy -289.397 -1.350 -183.701 -1.621
 




腀   Dependent腆  Holding insurance  Dependent腆  Holding insurance
Amount of income 0.001 5.708
*** 0.000 2.329
**
Amount of financial asset 0.000 -0.267 0.000 2.780
***
Occupation of non-household head dummy -0.056 -0.349 0.067 0.386
Children dummy  0.429 6.903
*** 0.579 8.475
***
Metropolitan dummy -0.038 -0.620 0.090 1.425
Pension dummy 0.142 1.771
* 0.257 3.341
***
Comparison of insurance companies dummy -0.266 -1.342 0.163 0.803
Knowledge dummy 0.336 5.550
*** 0.162 2.603
***






σ 3571  1342  
λ -1047  -171  
Ratio of selected household (%) 62.03% (=1243/2004) 31.64% (=634/2004)
Log-likelihood -14133  -6625  
*** : Significant at  1% level
**   : Significant at  5% level
*     : Significant at 10% level  15




1 Private (domestic) only 969 23.17%
2 Private (domestic) and Kampo 767 18.34%
3 Kampo only 295 7.05%
4 Private (domestic & foreign) and Kampo 174 4.16%
5 Private (domestic) and Kampo and JA mutual 164 3.92%




8 Private (domestic) and Other mutual 97 2.32%
9 Private (domestic) and JA mutual 95 2.27%
10 Private (foreign) only 91 2.18%
11 JA mutual only 90 2.15%
12 Kampo and JA mutual 87 2.08%
13 Other mutual only 66 1.58%
14 Private (foreign) and Kampo 58 1.39%
   16
Table 5:腀腀 Simultaneous Estimation Results of Life Insurance Holding Function
Case 1: Simultaneous Estimation of Holding Private  Domestic and Kampo
腀          Private Domestic                Kampo
Explanatory Var. Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
腀     Dependent: Holding insurance      Dependent: Holding insurance
Amount of income 0.000 6.356
*** 0.000 2.436
**
Amount of financial asset 0.000 -0.220 0.000 2.910
***
Occupation of non-household head dummy -0.038 -0.224 0.062 0.366
Children dummy  0.403 6.405
*** 0.580 8.420
***
Metropolitan dummy -0.054 -0.867 0.095 1.496
Pension dummy 0.143 1.782
* 0.256 3.400
***
Comparison of insurance companies dummy -0.253 -1.293 0.169 0.845
Knowledge dummy 0.336 5.590
*** 0.164 2.617
***







Ratio of selected household (%) 62.03% (=1243/2004) 31.64% (=634/2004)
Log-likelihood -2396.355     
*** : Significant at  1% level
**   : Significant at  5% level
*     : Significant at 10% level
Case 2: Estimation for Household with Private Domestic to Purchase Kampo Additionally
腀             Private Domestic                     Kampo
Explanatory Var. Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
腀     Dependent: Holding insurance     Dependent: Holding insurance
Amount of income 0.000 6.175
*** 0.000 -0.933
 
Amount of financial asset 0.000 0.319 0.000 2.541
**
Occupation of non-household head dummy -0.045 -0.265 0.048 0.289
Children dummy  0.403 6.420
*** 0.064 0.732
 
Metropolitan dummy -0.051 -0.841 0.060 0.975
 
Pension dummy 0.151 1.959
* 0.143 1.852
*
Comparison of insurance companies dummy -0.260 -1.346 0.138 0.662
Knowledge dummy 0.322 5.393
*** -0.148 -2.325
*







Ratio of selected household (%) 62.03% (=1243/2004) 37.41% (=465/1243)
Log-likelihood -2010.777     
*** : Significant at  1% level
**   : Significant at  5% level
*     : Significant at 10% level
 
 